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Wajid Rasheed
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Executive Summary
EPRasheed wishes to be able to model and predict oil prices out to a
time-horizon of 2050, taking into account a number of known factors.
These include the nite supply of oil, growing and shifting demand, the
viability of alternative energy sources (at dierent pricing levels) and
the interactions of oil producers and oil consumers, as they respond to
current pricing levels.
The study group concluded that while `prediction' of price in any mean-
ingful sense was not viable, a model for scenario analysis could be re-
alised. The model did not incorporate all of the factors of interest, but
did model important time lags in the response of market players' future
behaviour to current oil prices.
Consideration of the optimisation of supply through new capacity in the
telecoms industry led to a generalisation of the standard Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. This indicates how an output-constrained competitive mar-
ket might operate. It enables identication of dierent pricing regimes
determined by the level of competition and the resource limitations of
particular supplier rms.
Two models were developed suciently to enable simulation of various
conditions and events. The rst modelled oil price as a mean revert-
ing Brownian motion process. Strategies and scenarios were included
in the model and realistic simulations were produced. The second ap-
proach used stability analysis of an appropriate time-delayed dierential
equation. This enabled the identication of unstable conditions and the
realisation of price oscillations which depended on the demand scenarios.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Problem statement
(1.1.1) The problem is to develop a new model that attempts to model oil and
gas prices over the next 30 or 40 years. Data are provided for the nding
and lifting costs in dierent locations. Also provided are the historic
and adjusted oil prices, back to 1861. The oil price cycle is sensitive to
geopolitical, nonlinear factors as well as delayed time scales. The model
should be able to capture these factors in some way.
(1.1.2) The model should consider this oil and gas price cycle sensitivity across
dierent application areas, for example: transportation (road and air);
power generation; heating; petrochemicals; surfacings (road, roof, cement)
and lubricants. The model should also account for the discontinuities that
occur when renewables/alternatives start becoming viable.
2 Practical and political considerations
2.1 Trends in oil consumption
(2.1.1) At the present time, oil consumption is accounted for by a range of ap-
plication areas. Transportation in general is 50% of total, split between
aviation (18%), cars (61%), trucks (21%). Other sectors include: Power
Generation, 20%; Petrochemicals 10%; Heating 10%; Surfacing 5% and
Lubricants 5%.
(2.1.2) In the future, it is expected that transportation will account for 75% of
total, so becoming the primary source of oil consumption.
2.2 Oil reneries and oil rening
(2.2.1) Time lags: Two to ve years is a realistic timescale to factor in when we
consider the time it takes to get oil on the market. `Easy' oil has already
been accessed. Exploration for oil can take up to 3 years. If the oil is in a
location where drilling is easy (such as the Saudi desert) it will take one
year to drill the well. After this, the oil has to be piped. The infrastructure
will have to be built and/or upgraded. It may take a further year or two
to get the oil to market.
(2.2.2) Light vs. heavy crude: The world's current rening capacity is pri-
marily geared towards rening light crude oil. This is a problem because
most new crude coming on the market has a higher molecular weight and
is therefore heavier and more viscous. Fractional distillation is the ba-
sic process of renement. If there is more heavy oil, what that means is
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that there is less light oil (for transportation). Heavy oil must be further
rened, resulting in extra cost and additional infrastructure requirements.
(2.2.3) Sweet vs. sour crude: Furthermore, crude oil from dierent countries
has dierent molecular weight and dierent impurities, such as varying
levels of sulphur. Sour crude is that which has more than 5% sulphur and
oil with less than that percentage of sulphur is referred to as sweet crude.
Most of the world's rening capacity is geared towards sweet crude. This
is a problem because more and more sour crude is coming on to the market
and this is dicult to rene, as there is not the rening capacity.
(2.2.4) A new installation for rening crude has a lifespan of about 20-25 years.
(2.2.5) Oil production that can be accounted for is 82M barrels per annum. How-
ever, the known consumption is 85M. The shortfall of 3M is accounted for
by considering a variety of mechanisms, such as renery gain1 (typically
a factor of 1.02); undeclared production2; there is a stock tank holding an
unknown inventory3.
2.3 The gure of `known reserves'
(2.3.1) The `known reserves' gure of 1.2 trillion barrels of oil is a moving target.
These are the known reserves today for which there is infrastructure { i.e.
we can produce them. However, it is known that there are several factors
which will increase this number signicantly: at a certain threshold price
for crude, new technologies such as Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) become
viable. Furthermore, there are areas of the world that are unexplored and
there are areas that have been explored, but not yet exploited (i.e. known
reserves for which there is no infrastructure currently in place).
(2.3.2) A company will quote its oil reserves, meaning known oil reserves. How-
ever, there will also be a replacement factor which is a multiplier that tells
how these reserves will change over time. Most oil companies are (cur-
rently) replacing by a factor of 1.5 or 1.6. What this means is that each
known barrel of oil in reserve today will be replaced with 1.5 or 1.6 barrels
at some future date. This factor is dependent on oil price and uctuates
from year to year. It is generally an unknown number.
(2.3.3) Major multinational oil companies have a lot of cash. They have recently
been redistributing their cash to shareholders, or using it to buy back their
own shares. Note that they are not currently spending this cash heavily
on research into oil exploration because of the low price of crude oil.
1The oil has a lower density in the petrol tank than in the ground.
2Declaring production brings with it obligations to pay taxes, etc.
3The US stock tank is only 200k barrels.
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(2.3.4) State owned oil companies are used to balance the budget of the state to
which they belong. The main source of cash for OPEC member states is
from oil. When oil price drops below a certain point it is very damaging.
2.4 Alternative sources
(2.4.1) Alternative sources to oil could in future have a major impact on the oil
price. Some of the specic factors concerning alternative sources are noted
below, and further material is to be found in [1].
(2.4.2) The EU and Norway have restrictions on future sources of energy and so
R&D is required into alternative energy sources. A crucial factor is the
implementation of more ecological approaches.
(2.4.3) Furthermore, the EU wants to be independent from Russia and Ukraine,
so as not to be so dependent on Russian energy.
(2.4.4) Hybrid and electric vehicles are still some time away from mass availability.
As GDP goes up, so too does energy consumption per capita. Notwith-
standing the fact that wealthier countries use more energy, greater wealth
also makes it easier to diversify energy sources.
(2.4.5) There are two main car engine types: Otto cycle and diesel. Otto cycle can
use ethanol, a bio-fuel. Bio-diesel is not so straightforward to produce [1].
3 Modelling considerations
3.1 Time delays: inelastic markets
(3.1.1) Demand and supply are related to the price, although there is a `hard
bottom' to demand for oil (there is inelasticity in the demand for oil): a
certain threshold amount is required regardless of the price. This is clearly
a factor in transportation in general and in aviation in particular.
(3.1.2) If oil prices rise, companies seek to increase capacity and consumers seek to
decrease consumption. However, there is a time delay before either market
player can be eective. These two time delays (to consumer patterns and
producer responses) feed into each other and the model should capture
this in some way.
3.2 Modelling geopolitical shock events
(3.2.1) Although at any given time, a large geopolitical shock may be likely, that
shock could come from a variety of dierent sources. This makes such
events rather dicult to model.
3
Oil price cycle and sensitivity model ESGI68
3.3 Specic approaches proposed
(3.3.1) There was a general belief at the Study Group that the overall modelling
solution was likely to be complicated and possibly consist of several ap-
proaches. The Study Group identied the following factors as possible
components in an overall model.
(3.3.2) Adaptation of a model used to optimise the UK's energy mix on time-
horizons of 2020 and 2050, subject to welfare constraints that allow the
UK to meet its renewable targets. A specic model of this type is discussed
in [2].
(3.3.3) Adopt a basic textbook economic approach, examining supply and demand
curves.
(3.3.4) Examine models for adoption of new technologies in other industries and
see how or if these could be applied to the oil industry.
(3.3.5) Consider oil prices to be a mean reverting Brownian motion process, per-
turbed by endogenous market player strategies and exogenous shocks.
(3.3.6) Focus on transportation, as this will be the largest demand in the future.
(3.3.7) Consider a multi-agent simulation approach, that models various sectors
in the production/consumption chain as simple agents with simple be-
haviour.
(3.3.8) Reduce the problem by considering what proportion of a salary will one
spend on oil products. Check is there a stable point of your income vs.
price of oil.
(3.3.9) Check relationship between price of oil and other commodities, such as
gold. This may be particularly important in times of crises, when curren-
cies become more volatile.
(3.3.10) Inertia could be modelled as predator/prey time-delayed dierential equa-
tion.
4 Development of approaches
4.1 Global welfare optimisation model
(4.1.1) We seek to optimise global welfare, in some sense. Global welfare could
have various interpretations, such as reducing oil use. Ultimately, it trans-
lates to a single objective function in an optimisation routine.
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(4.1.2) The starting point is a deterministic model looking at future energy supply
scenarios. The global welfare goal is to compute optimal energy mixes
that will meet the UK's renewable energy target in 2020 and 2050 with
minimum cost. Note that it is dicult to talk about environmental targets
outside a stable known region such as UK.
(4.1.3) The objective function is the cost of energy discounted to 2009 values. The
original approach [2] models dierent parts of the market in a highly com-
plex way. It is deterministic, and it assumes knowledge of the technology
that will be available in 2050.
(4.1.4) The model consists of a deterministic optimization scenario tree, extending
into the future. The various parameters on each of the branches are set in
advance and probabilities are assigned to each branch. The model works
in ve-year blocks (but could work over any time resolution). At each
node in the tree, there are three dierent branches e.g. high, medium and
low economic growth. A further tree models technology growth as being
high, medium or low.
4.2 Predator/prey models
(4.2.1) The basic equations in predator/prey models are:
dx
dt
= x(  y) (1)
dy
dt
=  y(   x) : (2)
In this equation, y is the number of predators (foxes) and x is the number
of prey (rabbits). So we can consider the predators to relate to the supply
of oil (in barrels) and the prey to relate to the supply of money (price in
USD). In this sense, the barrels of oil are chasing after the money. This
model was modied to account for time lags, as supplies of oil in the future
are determined by the pricing levels today:
dS
dt
= S(P0   P ) (3)
dP
dt
=  P (S0   S) (4)
where P is the price, S is the oil supply and P0 and S0 are the historic
mean levels of price and supply.
(4.2.2) These were discretised using a rst order Euler approximation, i.e.:
Pn = Pn 1(1  (S0   Sn 1)t) (5)
Sn = Sn 1(1 + (P0   Pn)t) : (6)
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We are trying to solve for the parameters  and  with respect to the
historic data. The approach used was to implement the above in Matlab
and to compute an error term  dened as  = jS  S^j2(P0=S0)+ jP   P^ j2
where P and S are the computed and P^ and S^ are the real data. Note we
are multiplying by the factor P0=S0 to compensate for the dierent ranges
of the data. We used 11 years' data, from 1987 to 1997 and a simple
Nelder-Mead simplex optimisation algorithm (this nds local minima).
The optimal values were found to be  = 2:1013 and  = 0:4843.
(4.2.3) The resulting plot is in Figure 1. This plot that the supply vs. price follows
a circular pattern. This curve has achieved neutral stability which may
correspond to oil price vs. oil supply oscillations.
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Figure 1: Price vs. supply curve achieves neutral stability when
modelled with a predator/prey model.
4.3 Constrained output and technology optimisation
(4.3.1) This section adapts some ideas that have been proposed by Lanning et
al. in connection with telecommunication services [3], which look at opti-
mising the introduction of new technologies and management of capacity
in optical communications. The analogy with the energy sector is that
new technologies (such as faster optical bre) correspond to new energy
sources (such as new oil elds, renewables or biofuels). In both cases,
output is constrained by the currently available sources of capacity, which
are generically called `resources' below.
(4.3.2) The key points are as follows:
(a) Demand is a function of price. There is an elastic demand D for
bandwidth, with constant price elasticity  (see (8) below). The
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elasticity introduces a nonlinearity into the problem. At least some
elements in oil demand are known to be inelastic [1] and so presum-
ably some dierent function would need to be used for application
to oil pricing. Also, to model the possible substitution of oil by re-
newables, biofuels, etc, the demand may have several components,
corresponding to heat, fuel, etc. Moreover, there might no longer be
a single price, but instead tranches of capacity available at a sequence
of increasing prices, until demand and supply are in equilibrium.
(b) In [3], the objective for optimisation is the maximisation of the net
present value of cashows from the provision of telecommunications
services over some xed time horizon. This objective function would
need to be replaced with a suitable analogue for provision of heat,
fuel, etc.
(c) Lanning et al. assume that new technologies become available at
predetermined times k. The cost of acquiring new technology is
explicitly incorporated into the overall costs of service provision. It
would be possible to consider the impact of government interven-
tion, either to reduce costs of acquisition or operation. Interventions
might also bring forward the times at which new technologies become
available.
(4.3.3) An added complication occurs if we need to consider competitive provision
by a number of dierent suppliers. Note that the Lanning et al. model is
a monopoly. In practice, a competitive market with constraints on output
can be modelled using a so-called Cournot equilibrium, in which rms
choose outputs (to maximise prot) and then the market determines a
price. The model has two components: the economic objectives and cost
structure of individual rms (suppliers), and the equilibrium reached by
the market in response to its demand curve. The following paragraphs
look at each of these components in turn.
(4.3.4) The supply side. Firms generate prots by exploiting their resources in
order to provide output in the form of a service (fuel, heat, etc.) to con-
sumers. The magnitude of each rm's output is limited by the resources
that it owns. If rm Fi owns resources ri, then it may provide an output
qi in the range [0; ri] and in doing so generates an income of Pqi, where P
is the equilibrium price in the market in which the rm operates (P and
qi are determined as described below).
(4.3.5) We assume that rm Fi incurs a constant marginal cost ci in providing
each unit of service, in addition to the costs of resource access described
in the next paragraph. A constant marginal cost is not a fundamental
feature of the model, but it has the advantage of simplifying the explicit
derivation of equilibrium market prices.
(4.3.6) Apart from the marginal cost ci, each rm also incurs the costs of its access
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to resources. We assume that there is a xed cost aR for access to each
unit of resource. Note that these costs are incurred regardless of whether
or not the resources are actually used in providing a service (there is no
notion here of storing resources for future use; this would be a further
modication).
(4.3.7) The combined eect of the cost structure described above is that rm Fi
derives a prot i, given by
i = (P   ci)qi   aRri ; (7)
where, to summarize notation
P is the equilibrium price of the market in which Fi operates;
qi is the output of Fi;
ci is the marginal cost to Fi of providing each unit of output;
ri is the resource held by Fi;
aR is the cost of access to resource.
Underlying this discussion is an assumption that we are constructing the
prots per unit time of rm Fi.
(4.3.8) The demand side. Assume that the market reaches a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, which determines the prevailing price P at which rms pro-
vide a service to consumers. This price is reached in response to a con-
sumer demand Q of the form
Q =
A
P 
; (8)
where A is the demand potential of the market and  is the elasticity of
demand. It is implicitly assumed that  > 1.
(4.3.9) As a precursor to the more general treatment that is needed here, it is
useful to review the standard result that would give the equilibrium if the
market contained n identical rms, with no resource costs and a suciently
large resource that the rms' output is not constrained. The market price
in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is then given by
P =
c
1  1=(n) ;
where c is the (common) marginal cost to each rm of providing a unit of
output. This result is typically covered in graduate textbooks on microe-
conomics.
The consumer surplus in this situation is
1
  1
A
P  1
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and the total operator surplus is
1
n
A
P  1
:
Hence the consumer surplus represents a fraction
1 +
  1
n
 1
(9)
of the combined operator and consumer surplus.
(4.3.10) The well-known results of the previous paragraph need signicant rene-
ment to deal with restrictions on the rms' individual outputs qi, deter-
mined by the resources ri that they hold, and the fact that rms are not
identical, owing to variations in both ri and the marginal costs ci.
(4.3.11) To handle these eects, it is best to return to rst principles. The strategy
of individual rms is to choose qi to maximize prots i, as given by (7),
subject to the restriction that 0  qi  ri. This question naturally ts into
a Kuhn-Tucker framework for constrained optimization, with a solution
satisfying
@i
@qi
= i   i ; (10)
where i; i  0 are dual variables for the constraints qi  ri and qi  0,
respectively. By the standard theory for this type of problem, at the opti-
mal solution the dual variables satisfy complementary slackness conditions
i(ri   qi) = iqi = 0 :
In other words, i is equal to zero whenever qi is strictly less that ri and
i is equal to zero whenever qi is nonzero.
(4.3.12) Using (7) to be more explicit about the partial derivative in (10) gives
P   qi@P
@qi
  ci = i   i :
Derivation of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium now involves replacing @P=@qi
with dP=dQ; in other words, rms do not anticipate the eects that their
choice of output might have on the output of other rms. From (8),
dQ=dP =  Q=P and so (10) becomes
P

1  qi
Q

  ci = i   i ;
which, in the case where i = i = 0, i.e. 0 < qi < ri, may be rewritten as
qi =
A
P 

1  ci
P

; (11)
where (8) has been used to remove Q in favour of A and P .
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(4.3.13) Equation (11) gives qi as a function of P and is one of the key steps in
determining the market equilibrium. If P can be found, then this function
gives the corresponding output for rm Fi, at least if the constraints 0 
qi  ri do not bind. To extend to the case when the constraints do bind,
all that is needed is to cut the function o at 0 and ri, as illustrated in
Figure 2.
ci ci(e+1)/e
P
qi
ri
0
Figure 2: The relationship between the market price in equilibrium
and the output of rm Fi. The output is zero if P < ci and for
larger P is given by the curve shown, subject to a limiting value of ri.
(4.3.14) Figure 2 shows the situation in which ri is suciently small to aect the
rm's output. From left to right, the four possible regimes are: zero
output if the equilibrium price is smaller than the rm's marginal cost;
a regime with low price and low output, corresponding to many rms in
competition, each with a small market share; a plateau in which limited
resources mean that output is constrained to the level ri; and a regime
with high price and low output, which corresponds to a monopoly position
held by a single rm. If ri is larger than the maximum value of (11) then
the output will not be constrained by the limited availability of resources,
no matter what the equilibrium price, and so the plateau for mid-range
values of P will disappear.
(4.3.15) To calculate P , we simply sum (11) over all rms Fi in the same market
and remember that X
i
qi = Q =
A
P 
: (12)
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Continuing to think of qi as a function of P , we dene
i(P ) =
qi(P )P

A
and then, to satisfy (12), P is determined by requiring thatX
i
(P ) = 1 : (13)
(4.3.16) By considering the various regimes in Figure 2, we see that i(P ) is given
explicitly by
i(P ) =
8<:
0 if qi = 0
(1  ci=P ) if 0 < qi < ri
riP
=A if qi = ri ;
which in general has the form shown in Figure 3. Note that i(P ) is
monotonically increasing from a value of 0 when P = 0 to an asymptote
of  as P !1. Since  > 1 this is sucient to guarantee that (13) has a
unique solution for P .
P
fi
0 ci
e
e(1-ci/P)
riPe/A
Figure 3: The quantity i = qi(P )P =A as a function of the equilib-
rium market price P ;  is zero if P < ci and for larger P is given by
the lower of the two curves.
(4.3.17) To summarise, Lanning et al. discuss how to optimise the management
of supply through the introduction of new sources of capacity. However,
they restrict attention to a monopoly supplier. We have indicated how
an output-constrained competitive market might operate, by generalising
11
Oil price cycle and sensitivity model ESGI68
the standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium. It remains to build both of these
aspects into a single model. Even then, several issues of likely importance
have not been addressed, including the following.
(a) Producers might (and probably do) form a cartel and therefore avoid
being in Nash equilibrium.
(b) As already noted, the relation between price and demand is expected
to be more complicated than assumed above, and in particular there
is evidence for a inelastic element.
(c) The existence of spot price and futures price should also be consid-
ered; futures may have signicant impact on the spot price.
(d) In practice, some producers have and some do not have storage ca-
pacities (for example, oil vs. renewables).
4.4 Brownian motion with mean reversion
(4.4.1) Many commodity prices, P are modelled using a geometric Brownian mo-
tion model with mean price reversion. The mean price, M , is assumed to
be the marginal cost of production of the commodity; or in the case of
a cartel product such as oil, it is a pricing level at which the cartel are
happy to sell the product, in the long term. The relevant equation is:
dP = P (M   P )dt+ Pdz (14)
where  is the reversion factor,  is the asset volatility, dt is the time
increment (t measured in years), dP is the price increment and dz is the
Brownian term, i.e. dz =
p
dtN (0; 1), where N (0; 1) is a Gaussian with
mean zero and unit variance.
(4.4.2) In our system we assume a xed, long-term mean, ML = 40 and a daily
mean, M(t). The system is driven by three separate phenomena: Brow-
nian motion; shock events; and strategies employed by market players
(consumers and suppliers).
(4.4.3) Shock events are simulated as step changes to the system. During a shock
event, M(t) becomes MS,  becomes S and  becomes S. After the
shock event, parameters  and  revert (immediately) to typical values
 = 0:05 and  = 0:3, and M(t) reverts to ML = 40, the long-term mean.
(4.4.4) The inuence of players in the market is characterised by assuming that
both suppliers and consumers act today based on their perception of how
oil price is varying over time. This perception is arrived at by observing
the mean price over a short time period,  (e.g. the previous 6 months):
P =
1

tX
i=t 
P (i) : (15)
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t1 t2 M(t)  
3.00 3.50 80 0.05 0.45
4.00 4.75 90 0.05 0.55
5.00 5.50 70 0.05 0.50
7.00 7.50 100 0.05 0.3500
Table 1: This table shows the series of shocks applied during Event 2. Each shock
starts at time t1, ends at time t2, and sets M(t),  and  to the given values for the
duration of the event.
(4.4.5) Both players base their decisions on the observed mean shift, OS = P ML.
Initially, M(t) = ML for all t. Because of the strategies of both players,
M(t+ 2)!ML + f(OS) (16)
where function f is simply f(OS) =  kOS, for some constant k. In this
way, players in the market form an opinion that oil is too expensive (or too
cheap) and act to make it cheaper (or more expensive), but their actions
can only become eective at some time 2 in the future.
(4.4.6) Two shock event scenarios were simulated. In Event 1, a single, large
shock event occurred starting at t = 5 (start of Year 5) and ending at
t = 5:5. The shock set M(t) = 200 for 5  t  5:5 and set  = 0:3 and
 = 0:05 for the same period. In event 2, a series of shocks occurred,
which are summarised in Table 1.
(4.4.7) Figure 4 shows how oil price behaves in the shock received in Event 1 and
Figure 5 shows how the oil price behaves when it receives the shock series
of Event 2.
4.5 Demand/supply curves modelled with delay dierential
equations
(4.5.1) Taking an economics `textbook' approach, we can look at demand and
supply curves, i.e. the price vs. quantity for demand (D) and supply (S).
In simple terms, as S goes up, D goes down.
(4.5.2) Supply can be categorised as coming from either OPEC or non-OPEC
countries. Demand can be categorised as coming from either the US,
EU, China, Japan or India. Customers are one of either government,
consumers or companies. There is a time delay in the supply and demand
curve.
(4.5.3) Various factors that exert upward (") and/or downward (#) pressure on
the supply curve:
(a) Time lags "#
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Figure 4: The blue curve shows the reaction of simulated oil price to
a single large shock event (see text for details). The red curve shows
the underlying mean value, M(t) to which the Brownian process is
trying to revert. Note the oscillations caused by the actions of the
market players to perceived changes in oil price.
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Figure 5: The blue curve shows the reaction of simulated oil price
to a series of smaller shock events (see text for details). The red
curve shows the underlying mean value, M(t) to which the Brownian
process is trying to revert. Again, note the oscillations caused by the
actions of the market players to perceived changes in oil price.
(b) Investment (looking for new oil) "
(c) Investment in alternatives technologies #
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(d) Ecological restrictions #
(e) Investment in existing infrastructure "
(4.5.4) Similarly, various factors exert ("#) pressure on the demand curve:
(a) Time lags "#
(b) `big car' fashion "
(c) Investment in alternatives technologies #
(d) Ecological restrictions #
(e) Investment in existing infrastructure "
(f) Increasing world population "
(g) Increasing world GDP "
(h) Politics of the EU #
(i) Lower prices of alternatives #
(4.5.5) Additionally, demand can be strongly aected by war, natural catastro-
phes and economic crises.
(4.5.6) We know that the oil price change depends on the supply-demand balance.
If P (t) is the price of energy (in USD) at time t, demand is given by D(t)
and supply by S(t), one can set up a dierential equation as follows,
dP (t)
dt
= (D(t)  S(t)) (17)
where  is a sensitivity parameter.
(4.5.7) Our supply model can be written as:
S(t) = F (P (t  )) (18)
where F is some function (to be dened). This assumes that capacity is
dependent on decisions made using the price  years ago (e.g.  ' 15) so
that (17) becomes a delay dierential equation.
(4.5.8) A plot of F against P is given in Figure 1, p277 in [1]. A reasonable
approximation to this function is
F =
110
3
log

P
5

(19)
(assuming P > 5).
(4.5.9) We experimented with several price-demand relationships that were cal-
ibrated to give supply-demand balance at around P = 45 (USD) and
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demand D = 80 (Million barrels of oil). Demand decreases monotonically
with price and hence we propose the formulations,
DA = 80 45=P
DB =
20 45=P| {z } + 60|{z}
Elastic Inelastic
DC = DB exp(t=80) : (20)
Model DB captures aspects of the elastic and inelastic demand for oil
which are not captured by DA. Model DC is the same as model DB with
a continuously compounded growth factor of 1=80 per annum.
(4.5.10) Combining (17, 18) and observing that (19) implies F = F (P ) and (20)
implies D = D(P; t) gives:
dP (t)
dt
=  [D(P (t); t)  F (P (t  ))] : (21)
(4.5.11) We proceed in a quasi-static framework where we assume D depends on t
only through P and is not intrinsically dependent on time (cases DA and
DB but not case DC). Then the behaviour of (21) can be examined via
stability analysis and linearisation about the equilibrium point P  = 45.
In the standard ODE case with  = 0, the eigenvalue  [D0(P )  F 0(P )]
is always negative as the rate of change of demand with respect to price
is negative and the rate of change of production with respect to price is
positive. Hence the system is stable.
(4.5.12) In the delay dierential equation case where  > 0, we can write P =
P  + P^ . Linearising we obtain:
P^ = 
h
D0(P )P^ (t)  F 0(P )P^ (t  )
i
: (22)
(4.5.13) Substituting P^ (t) = cet gives,
 = 

D0(P )  F 0(P )e  : (23)
We proceed via neutral stability analysis by setting  = i! (where ! is
real).
(4.5.14) Equating real and imaginary parts of (23) we get,
0 = D0(P )  F 0(P ) cos(!) (24)
! = F 0(P ) sin(!) : (25)
(4.5.15) If we re-arrange (24) and square and add to (25) squared, we obtain the
following expression for !,
! = 
p
F 0(P )2  D0(P )2 (26)
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which has a real solution consistent with the ansatz provided
jF 0(P )j > jD0(P )j : (27)
(4.5.16) If (27) holds, either real value of ! from (26) may be substituted into (23)
via the  = i! ansatz to obtain a condition which holds between the model
parameters at the loss of stability.
(4.5.17) The result is that loss of stability occurs at
 =
1p
F 0(P )2  D0(P )2PV sin
 1
 s
1  D
0(P )2
F 0(P )2
!
: (28)
(4.5.18) We know that the loss of stability occurs as  increases, because we have
shown stability in the ODE case  = 0.
(4.5.19) For demand prole DA (no inelastic demand), condition (27) fails. Hence
there can be no change in stability as  is varied and hence the equilib-
rium is stable at all parameter values.
(4.5.20) For demand proles DB (component of elastic demand), condition (27)
holds, hence (since we x  = 15) there is a critical price sensitivity
 given by (28) above which stability is lost and limit cycle oscillations
result (see Figure 6). It is curious to note that the t!1 behaviour thus
depends critically on D0(P ), which is not a quantity well calibrated from
data.
(4.5.21) When we take demand function DC , which is intrinsically time-dependent,
the balance of supply and demand gives rise to an increasing equilibrium
price P (t) which is now only an equilibrium in the quasi-static sense,
i.e. to perturbations which are much faster than the time-scale of intrinsic
demand. However as time increases, not only does DC , but so also does its
derivative with respect to P . Hence although oscillatory behaviour may
be possible at intermediate times, eventually condition (27) will fail (in a
loose quasi-static sense) and the price will become monotone increasing
in time (see Figure 7). Note this result is sensitive to how demand grows
with time { if the proportion of elastic and inelastic demand also changed
in the long-term, then the conclusion may well be dierent.
5 Summary
5.1 General comments
(5.1.1) A dicult problem was framed in mathematical context, leading to a
lively discussion in which several approaches were proposed and discussed.
Several plausible approaches were identied.
17
Oil price cycle and sensitivity model ESGI68
0 50 100 150 200
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
time: years
pr
ice
: d
ol
la
rs
Figure 6: Limit cycle for mixed elastic/inelastic demand when de-
mand is steady.
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Figure 7: Limit cycle for mixed elastic/inelastic demand when de-
mand is steadily increasing.
(5.1.2) A game-theoretic approach was proposed in Section 4.3. This approach
proposed a curve relating market price in equilibrium to the output of an
individual rm. In this curve, dierent pricing regimes could be identied.
Limitations and possible extensions of this approach were also discussed.
(5.1.3) Two scenario analysis models were proposed. These incorporate time-
delayed positive feedback eects caused by dierent players in the mar-
ketplace modifying their behaviour. The rst model (Section 4.4) used a
18
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Brownian motion approach to simulate oil as a mean reverting commodity.
This model was able to realise stochastic, oscillating behaviour not unlike
what is observed in reality. The second approach (Section 4.5) used a
time-delayed dierential equation and has parameters estimated from real
data. It gave realistic price oscillations which depended on the demand
scenarios.
(5.1.4) The scenario analysis work could be extended by developing either model
to account in a more nuanced way for the dierent application areas identi-
ed in Section 1.1, in addition to dealing with the step changes associated
with alternatives to oil becoming viable at dierent pricing levels.
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